Five capability areas, in production.
Verified against real code and git history. Only shipped features listed here — unbuilt items are in the roadmap.
AI / LLM security testing is its own area here, not a footnote under exploitation: prompt injection and jailbreak testing against LLM and agent endpoints, MITRE ATLAS mapped. A confirmed agent-permission escape needs the target to expose its own tool-call trace — without one, a result is a triage signal, not a filed finding.
Every capability below runs two ways: run it yourself, free, forever — no account needed for the CLI — or have Ryvx run it for you on our own hardware, billed in credits. Only web-application scans have a hosted path today; each group is tagged below with where it stands. See pricing for how hosted credits work.
- ✓Fingerprinting, dependency/SCA scanning
- ✓Static rule analysis — Terraform, IAM, Dockerfile
- ✓Skills library (19 tech stacks + protocols)
- ✓HTTP traffic log and replayscoped; not full MITM proxy
- ✓Multi-step browser automation (approval-gated)
- ~API security graph mappingendpoint surface only, no auth-boundary graph yet
- ✓Scripted pre-scan checks — headers, cookie flags, well-known paths, JS-bundle secret scan, backend fingerprint, transportdeterministic, zero LLM cost; observations only — never files a finding on its own
- ✓Core agent graph with PoC-verification gate on every finding
- ✓Per-agent Docker sandbox isolation, secrets-at-rest redaction
- ✓Kubernetes attack-path analysis
- ✓Autonomous remediation PRs — real GitHub round-triprun-it-yourself only — no hosted job type for this yet
- ✓Domain-control challenge for target authorization
- ~Encryption at rest for scan findingsopt-in; report.md and findings.sarif stay plain text by design
- ✓LLM prompt injection testing — encoding-bypass variants (base64 / rot13 / leetspeak), MITRE ATLAS mapped
- ~AI agent red-teaming — can your agent be talked past its own permissionsconfirmed escapes need the target to expose tool calls; otherwise triage-only
- ~Adaptive multi-turn jailbreak strategies — PAIR, TAP, and Crescendo, driven by the scan's own modelsame rule as the fixed battery above: the judge's score is advisory, only a real tool-call trace confirms an escape
→ Zero-config on top of a normal scan: `ryvx --target <endpoint> --agent-policy <preset>` — no separate account or key beyond the LLM you already configured.
- ✓Tier 1 static triage — strings, radare2, capa, floss, real microVM
- ✓Quick-triage mode + full RE UI in the dashboard
- ~Tier 2 auto-solve (angr) + LLM escalation, PoC-gatedsolved a trivial crackme; not against packed, obfuscated, or genuinely malicious samples
- ✓YARA / IOC generation + MalwareBazaar reputation
- ✓Windows VM backend (QEMU/WHPX-accelerated)
- ~Tier 3 — Ghidra headless decompilation84 functions on a trivial PE; not run against real malware
→ Needs QEMU/KVM (or WHPX on Windows, HVF on macOS) plus an ~8GB guest image, neither bundled in the installer. `ryvx setup` (CLI) or the desktop app's Setup page detects both and names the exact fix.
- ✓Executive view, trend analytics, attack-chain visualization
- ✓Compliance-tag surfacing across 6 frameworks
- ✓PDF export, evidence bundles (HAR + screenshot)
- ✓SARIF, JSON, Markdown export — SARIF ingested natively by GitHub, GitLab and Defender; scan events can also push to Slack, Microsoft Teams, Discord, email, or a generic webhooka finding that wasn't independently confirmed says so in the report rather than being presented as proven
- ✓Triage queue, asset inventory, knowledge graph, one-click re-test
- ✓Public REST API (/api/v1) — API-key auth, trigger and list scans from CI without a browser session
- ✓Per-run token and cost telemetry — input/output/cache breakdown per agent, not just a run total
- ~Full analytics for hosted scansthe hosted UI has no backend behind /api -- triage, compliance, analytics, asset inventory, knowledge graph, and scheduled scans don't render there; hosted gets raw findings only today
- ~Hosted scan execution — queue a scan, a worker claims and runs it off your machineone worker process on a personal machine behind NAT, no auto-restart after reboot; its container has no Docker CLI, so per-agent sandbox isolation degrades to a shell denylist
- ~Continuous monitoring — scheduled scans, delta tracking, Slack/Teams/Discord/email alertsruns while the desktop app is open (its sidecar hosts the scheduler); not a 24/7 hosted monitor